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With West Virginia having just become the twenty-sixth state to pass right-to-
work (RTW) legislation, the U.S. labor relations movement is at a tipping point. Other 
policy makers are closely watching the recent revival of RTW laws that has occurred 
over the last five years and are analyzing relevant studies to determine whether passing 
legislation that would outlaw union shops in their states might be worth a second look. 
With this paper I intend to examine one of the dominant arguments against 
enacting RTW legislation in a state, which is that this legislation results in a greater 
degree of state-level income inequality. I will also analyze the effects of RTW legislation 
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With West Virginia having just become the twenty-sixth state to pass right-to-
work (RTW) legislation, the U.S. labor relations movement is at a tipping point. Other 
policy makers are closely watching the recent revival of RTW laws and are analyzing 
relevant studies to determine whether passing legislation that would outlaw union shops 
in their states might be worth a second look.  
The current literature is largely divided concerning the effects of RTW legislation 
on a state’s economy. Many supporters of this legislation claim that RTW states 
experience greater economic growth and higher employment rates than non-RTW states. 
Those who oppose this legislation claim that it leads to greater income inequality by 
weakening union bargaining power, ultimately reducing wages for low-skilled workers. 
While researchers have extensively examined the extent to which RTW 
legislation affects employment rates, wages, and union membership rates, very few 
researchers have examined whether or not RTW legislation contributes to an increase in 
income inequality for these states. The primary focus of this paper is to evaluate whether 
one of the arguments most frequently used by opponents of RTW legislation is actually 











The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made it illegal to require employees to be union 
members as a prior condition to their employment. This type of arrangement was known 
in industrial relations as a “closed shop” arrangement. However, arrangements known as 
“union shops” are still legal in the United States today even though they are almost 
unheard of in the rest of the industrialized world. Union shop arrangements are a form of 
union security clause in which workers must join a labor union within a designated time 
frame after their hire date and pay union membership dues as a condition of their 
continued employment.  
Although the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 did not abolish union shops, the act 
granted individual states the power to pass legislation that would make union shops 
illegal in facilities operating within their borders. These states, also known as RTW 
states, typically have employment arrangements known as “open shop” agreements 
where workers are free to choose to be union members or not at no risk to their 
employment status with the company. Workers in a RTW state are also exempt from 
paying union dues should they choose not to be a union member unless specific 
arrangements, known as “agency shop” agreements, are negotiated between the union 
and the company. Agency shop agreements require workers to pay a fee to cover the 
costs of collective bargaining whether or not a worker is actually a union member. This 
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type of arrangement is designed to combat workers who receive all of the benefits of a 
collective bargaining agreement but contribute nothing to help cover a union’s expenses 










There is an extensive amount of existing research on the economic effects of right 
to work legislation, but the existing research is largely divided on the issue. Most of the 
debate within the literature arises from methodological differences in how the researchers 
attempt to control for unobservable state-level variables in their models. Much of the 
differences in results can be attributed to the different methodologies used and how they 
impact the results of the empirical studies. Moore (1998) cautions that individual findings 
related to the economic impact of RTW legislation is highly sensitive to model 
specification.  
Many empirical studies are primarily focused on identifying a relationship 
between RTW legislation and wages. Some studies specifically set out to examine union 
wages while others examine average wages for the entire state. Most researchers agree 
that average wages in RTW states are lower than average wages in non-RTW states. 
Gould and Kimball (2015) followed up research conducted by Gould and Shierholz 
(2011) about the compensation disparities in RTW states. These studies controlled for 
differences in the cost of living between RTW states and non-RTW states as well as 
demographic differences between the populations which would affect average wages for 
the states. For example, in the sample of RTW states, the average level of educational 
attainment was lower than in non-RTW states and there was a larger demographic 
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composition of minority populations which, on average, receive lower wages. Both 
reports stated that wages are higher for union and non-union workers in non-RTW states 
than in RTW states. However, the authors admit that there may be some unobservable 
state-level characteristics other than those controlled for in the study that may lead to 
lower compensation for workers in a RTW state. 
Sherk (2015) in his testimony for the Wisconsin Senate agreed that, on average, 
RTW states have lower wages than non-RTW states and hypothesized about some of the 
unobserved state-level characteristics that may attribute to this phenomenon that were not 
included in the model used by Gould and Kimball (2015). While Sherk (2015) agreed 
that cost-of-living adjustments are necessary when comparing RTW states and non-RTW 
states, he also stated that The Heritage Foundation recreated the analysis done by Gould 
and Kimball (2015) and found that their research contained mistakes concerning the 
state-level control variables used in the model and measurement errors in their cost-of-
living variables. Once corrected, Sherk (2015) confirmed that The Heritage Foundation 
found no statistically significant correlation between wages and RTW legislation.  
In contrast to the Gould and Kimball (2015) study which found a negative 
relationship between RTW legislation and wages and The Heritage Foundation’s study 
communicated by Sherk (2015) which found no relationship at all, Reed (2003) analyzed 
state-level data to conclude that wages in RTW states were actually higher than wages in 
non-RTW states when one controls for state economic conditions prior to the RTW 
policy change. Reed (2003) points out in his discussion that states that adopt RTW 
legislation are typically poorer than other states and therefore have a historical trend of 
lower wages for various reasons. He then argues that failure to control for this may be the 
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reason why some studies have found a negative relationship between wages and RTW 
legislation. Sherk (2015) also examines the relationship between RTW legislation and 
state unemployment levels, finding that RTW legislation can be linked to a significant 
reduction in unemployment levels in these states.  
Eren and Ozbeklik (2016) conducted a case study of Oklahoma using the recently 
developed synthetic control method to examine private sector wages and employment 
rate as well as private sector unionization rates before and after RTW legislation was 
passed in the state. Their analysis showed that RTW legislation had a negative impact on 
private sector unionization rates in Oklahoma and had no short run impact on total 
employment and average wages for Oklahoma’s private sector. The narrow scope of this 
study is a limitation in that it only examines Oklahoma and does not account for the 
effects RTW legislation has had on other states that have adopted the same legislation. 
While a majority of the research in done on RTW legislation involves the policy’s 
effect on wages, there are a few other studies which delve into other economic issues. In 
his literature review of the economic effects of RTW legislation, Moore (1998) divides 
the areas of interest in the literature into five main categories. In his synopsis of the 
current literature up to that time, Moore stated that the empirical studies concerning RTW 
legislation predominantly dealt with one of the following topics: the impact of RTW 
legislation on unionization and union organizing efforts and successes, determinants of 
RTW legislation, the extent of free riding in RTW states, the influence of RTW 
legislation on state levels of industrial development, and the effects of RTW legislation 
on wages. From our previous discussion, we can surmise that more recent studies have 
been primarily focused on the effects of RTW legislation on wages and employment and 
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have used these measures as a basis for broader assumptions about the overall impact of 
RTW policies on states’ economic health.  
Very few studies of the economic effects of RTW legislation stray beyond an 
examination of wages and employment. One notable study that goes further, examines 
how RTW legislation affects industrial development in a state. A study conducted by 
Holmes (1998) examined the borders between RTW states and non-RTW states to 
determine the differences in location decisions made by manufacturing facilities. This 
study used RTW policy decisions to classify a state as either a pro-business or anti-
business toward manufacturing. State-level characteristics that might affect 
manufacturing activity other than the RTW policy decision were controlled for through 
the use of border counties which would have similar geographic conditions and 
demographic populations. Holmes (1998) found that there was a significant correlation 
between RTW legislation and manufacturing activity between bordering states. He then 
theorized that an increase in industrial development would positively impact a state’s 
economic outlook by increasing employment and long-term wages.  
My research aims to broaden the scope of analysis even further than the studies 
mentioned above. I use state-level data to determine how RTW legislation affects states’ 
real per capita disposable income levels and the degree of income inequality within the 
states.  
 Currently there are only two other papers which examine how RTW legislation 
affects income inequality. The first paper, written by Nieswiadomy, Slottje, and Hayes 
(1991), utilizes a simultaneous equations model and state-level Gini coefficients 
calculated from data taken from the Census of the Population in 1970 and again in 1980. 
8 
 
The study found that states with RTW laws appeared to have higher levels of income 
inequality in 1970, but found no significant difference between levels of income 
inequality in RTW states when compared with non-RTW states in 1980. 
A current working paper of the American Enterprise for Public Policy Research 
adopted the Synthetic Control Method to examine the effects of RTW legislation on 
state-level income inequality (Jordan, et al. 2016). The authors reported that RTW 
legislation did not contribute to the worsening of income inequality in Louisiana, Idaho, 
Texas, and Oklahoma (Jordan, et al. 2016).  
This paper addresses the same question concerning the relationship between RTW 
legislation and state-level income inequality; however, this paper utilizes the Ordinary 
Least Squares method, which is different than the methods used by either of the previous 
studies discussed above. This study has an advantage over the study conducted by 
Nieswiadomy, Slottje, and Hayes (1991) due to the availability of more data, including 
additional states that have changed to RTW states since 1991, and yearly state-level Gini 
coefficients rather than Gini coefficients calculated once every ten-year census period. 
The study conducted by Jordan, et al. examines income inequality using Louisiana, 
Idaho, Texas, and Oklahoma, while the study presented in this paper focusses on 









Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001) estimated union membership and union 
coverage rates by state which were published in The Monthly Labor Review. Both 
measurements were taken because union membership and union coverage rates can 
actually be quite different in RTW states where workers can choose to be a union 
member or not at no risk to their employment with the company. The models used in this 
study focus on union membership rates, which are more likely to change as a result of 
RTW legislation than union coverage rates; however, union coverage rates were also 
examined. 
Education levels and state-level Gini coefficients were taken from Frank (2009). 
The percentage of the population that graduated from college was used as a measurement 
for educational attainment, with the assumption that these college graduates would also 
have graduated from high school or earned an equivalent level of education.  
Gini coefficients are used in the model as a measure of income inequality within a 
state. While Gini coefficients accurately measure the spread of how income is distributed 
throughout a state’s population, a weakness of using the Gini coefficient measure is that 
it is a relative measure that ignores absolute wealth. The Gini coefficient cannot tell 
specifically how income inequality is changing, only that the spread of income 
distribution is getting wider or smaller. For example, it could be that the degree of 
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income inequality is getting higher while the absolute wealth is also increasing for the 
entire population.  
Real per capita disposable income levels for the time period were taken from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). Gross state product levels were also obtained from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015) from 1963 to 2014. It should be noted here that 
there is a break in this dataset in 1997 due to differences in calculation methods used 
before and after this date as well as sources of the data used for these calculations. Gross 
state product figures between 1963 and 1997 were calculated using the SIC industry 
definitions while the figures between 1997 and 2014 were calculated using NAICS 
industry definitions, which redefined several income components for gross state product. 
The discontinuity in the data limited the focus of this study to the NAICS definitions of 
gross state product from 1997 to 2014, during which time only three states passed RTW 
legislation. Having only three states within the sample time period that passed RTW 
legislation is certain to affect the reliability of the results, even assuming that most of the 
economic effects of RTW legislation would be most evident in the years following the 
passing of such legislation,  
State-level data for civilian population, labor force, employment rates, and 
unemployment rates were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.). Data 
concerning which states have passed RTW legislation and when that legislation was 
passed was gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2016). This 
information is summarized in Figure 1, which illustrates a map of the current RTW states, 
and Table 2, which provides a comprehensive list of the RTW states and the dates when 
the legislation was enacted in those states.  
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Summary statistics for this collection of data can be found in Table 1. The Gini 
coefficients range from zero, which represents perfect equality, to one, which represents 
perfect inequality. The Gini coefficients in this dataset range from .526 to .733. 
Measurements of each of the variables were taken for all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia for each year from 1997 to 2014, resulting in 867 observations. Population 
density was calculated by dividing the state population for each year by the number of 
square miles within that state. The average employment rate during this time period was 
62.96%. The percent of the population that earned a bachelor’s degree ranged from 9.8% 
to 45.3% during the period, which is reflective of the upward trend toward higher 
education between 1997 and 2014. The gross state product figures are measured in 
millions of chained 2009 dollars. Over the time period, the average gross state product 
was roughly $268.694 billion dollars. Per capita disposable income was measured in real 









An estimation of the impact of RTW legislation on per capita disposable income 
within a state can be estimated by the following model: 
 
Per Capita Disposable Incomeit = βo + β1RTWit + δΖit + λt + αi + εit  (1) 
 
The independent variable RTW is a dummy variable for each state (t) that is equal 
to one if the state had an established RTW policy in the year (i) and zero if the state did 
not. If a state passed RTW legislation prior to June 30th, the date from the current year 
was used to determine the dummy variable. The year following the date RTW legislation 
was passed in the state was used if the legislation was passed after June 30th of that year. 
The other independent variables in the model are denoted by (δΖit). These independent 
variables include population density, employment rate, educational attainment at the 
collegiate level, union membership rates, and gross state product.  
A second model, shown below, is used to estimate the effect RTW legislation has 
on the degree of income inequality within a state, where higher Gini coefficients 
correspond to higher degrees of income inequality: 
 
Giniit = βo + β1RTWit + δΖit + λt + αi + εit     (2) 
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The other independent variables in this model (δΖit) are population density, 
unemployment rate, educational attainment at the collegiate level, union membership 
rates, and gross state product. Time trends (λt ) were used in both models to control for 
both the upward trend in per capita disposable income and the upward trend in income 
inequality over time. State fixed effects (αi) were used to control for unobservable 
characteristics within the states that most likely did not change over time but that may 
have an effect on the dependent variables.  Standard errors (εit) in both models were 
clustered at the state level. 
I expect to find no significant change in per capita disposable income levels and 
no significant change in income inequality due to the enactment RTW legislation. Union 
membership rates are likely to fall after RTW legislation is passed in a state, but the 
percentage of employees covered under a collective bargaining agreement is not likely to 
change as a result of this legislation. In practice, companies rarely distinguish between 
union members and nonmembers when dealing with wages and benefits. So, even if an 
employee chooses not to join a union and pay union dues, that employee is likely still 
covered under the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the union and the 
company (Sherk 2015). Therefore, union coverage rates are not as likely to fluctuate 
when RTW legislation is passed in that state, meaning that there should be no short-run 










Regression results from the model used to estimate real per capita disposable 
income can be found in Table 3. A simple regression found in Column 1 finds that RTW 
states have lower per capita disposable income levels on average than states which do not 
have this legislation. When controlling for other variables such as population density, 
employment rates, educational attainment, union membership rates, and gross state 
product, there emerges a significant positive relationship between RTW legislation and 
per capita disposable income levels. The model used in Column 3 controls for the overall 
upward trend in real per capita disposable income levels using a time trend. While the 
positive impact of RTW is smaller when controlling for changes over time, the model is 
Column 3 suggests that RTW legislation could add about $1,442 to real per capita 
disposable income. 
However, when using state fixed effects along with these controls, this 
relationship dissolves and we see no statistically significant relationship between RTW 
legislation and per capita disposable income, as shown in Column 4. The models used in 
Column 4, Column 5, and Column 6 employ state fixed effects to control for unobserved 
characteristics of the states that might also impact per capita disposable income levels. 
There continues to be no relationship between RTW legislation and per capita disposable 
15 
 
income levels no matter how the model controls for time, whether by using year dummy 
variables or a time trend in conjunction with state fixed effects. 
 The regressions in these Column 5 and Column 6 specifically examine the three 
states which passed RTW legislation within the time period: Oklahoma, Indiana, and 
Michigan. In Column 5 we can see that there is a significant positive relationship 
between RTW states and per capita disposable income, but this regression does not 
control for time. Column 6 shows no relationship between RTW legislation and per 
capita disposable income levels when time controls are used in the model.  
The regression results for the second model to estimate income inequality can be 
found in Table 4. Column 1 shows the results of a simple linear regression using Gini 
coefficients as the dependent variable and only post RTW has the independent variable. 
As you can see from Column 1, RTW states have higher levels of income inequality than 
non-RTW states by about 1.3%. Once other variables, such as population density, 
unemployment rate, educational attainment, union membership rates, and gross state 
product, are controlled for, there is an even stronger positive relationship between RTW 
legislation and income inequality. However, due to the overall increase in income 
inequality in the United States that began in the 1980s (Frank 2014), any model that does 
not utilize some sort of time trend to control for this is likely to suffer from omitted 
variable bias and overestimate the effect of RTW legislation on income inequality. 
The most extensive models used to estimate income inequality are found in 
Column 4, Column 5, and Column 6. All three models use state fixed effects and the 
multiple control variables listed above as well as a time trend or year dummy variables. 
The regression shown in Column 4 examines all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
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and shows that RTW legislation had no statistically significant impact on income 
inequality when one controls for the upward trend in income inequality in the U.S.  
The regressions shown in Column 5 and Column 6 examine only those three 
states that changed to RTW states within the time period. As shown by the results in 
Table 4 when comparing these columns, the relationship between RTW legislation and 
income inequality is very sensitive to how one controls for the upward trend in income 
inequality in the United States. The regression in Column 5 uses a time trend to control 
for the overall increase in income inequality found in each state over time and finds no 
statistically significant correlation between RTW legislation and increases in income 
inequality. Column 6 uses year dummy variables to control for this trend, but finds a 
significant positive relationship between RTW legislation and income inequality within 
the three states that most recently passed RTW legislation.  
The fact that the results are so sensitive to how the model controls for time 
variables calls these results into question. Since the regressions in Columns 5 and 6 only 
examined the states that recently passed RTW legislation, these results are from an 
incredibly small sample and should not be regarded as absolute. If the increase we see in 
income inequality is legitimate, this could be evidence that there is a short-run increase in 
income inequality for states soon after RTW legislation is passed. I hypothesize that this 
increase in income inequality could be a short-run phenomenon because of the lack of 
evidence from the model used in Column 4 that examined income inequality in all states 









One of the most common arguments against RTW legislation is that it leads to 
greater income inequality by resulting in a reduction in the wages of low-skilled workers. 
According to the data presented here, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
degree of income inequality within states that pass RTW legislation. When looking solely 
at the three states that passed RTW legislation within the period from 1997 to 2014, we 
can see a significant positive correlation between RTW legislation and income inequality 
for these states. However, since this result is not present when all states are considered, 
including states that have been RTW states for decades, this result should be examined 
critically due to the small sample size. If this result has merit, I hypothesize that the 
relationship between RTW legislation and income inequality is short run. In the long-
term, I conclude that RTW legislation does not have any significant effect on income 
inequality within a state when controlling for time and other variables affecting 
inequality. There was also no significant change in real per capita disposable income 
levels for states which passed RTW legislation when time variables are employed in the 
model, meaning that the after-tax income per citizen in RTW states did not change as a 
result of RTW legislation.  
The positive effects of RTW legislation might potentially be dwindling as the 
manufacturing sector contributes less and less to a state’s overall gross state product. A 
18 
 
state considering passing RTW legislation now would most likely not receive the same 
economic benefits of a state which passed such legislation in the 1940s or 1950s. An 
extension to this research would be to look at dates prior to 1997 to determine if the 
economic benefits of RTW legislation were greater in the past when the manufacturing 
sector contributed more to the U.S. economy.  
Another potential line of inquiry would be to examine a proxy measure for 
industrial development and employment rates for states following a RTW policy change. 
One of the main arguments in support of RTW legislation is that it attracts businesses to 
the state, increasing the amount labor demanded, and by extension, wages. Revisiting this 
study in later years would allow for the inclusion of states like Wisconsin and West 
Virginia that only recently passed RTW legislation as there is currently not enough data 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics  
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Civilian Population 867 4.420e+06 4.898e+06 365,527 2.979e+07 
Percent Employed of Population 867 62.96 4.586 50 73 
Educational Attain. (High 
School) 
867 0.632 0.0386 0.526 0.733 
Educational Attain. (College) 867 0.185 0.0461 0.0979 0.453 
Gross State Product 867 268,694 323,815 19,517 2.056e+06 
Gini 867 0.593 0.0356 0.521 0.711 
Per Capita Disposable Income 867 31,149 7,270 17,277 59,529 
Percent Covered by Union 867 13.13 5.592 3.300 28.40 
Percent Union Member 867 11.70 5.600 2.300 26.90 
Population Density 867 296.5 1,085 0.742 8,791 























TABLE 2: Dates of RTW Legislation 
 
 
Right-to-Work State     Date 
Arkansas      November 07, 1944 
Florida       November 07, 1944 
Arizona      November 05, 1946 
Nebraska      December 11, 1946 
Virginia      January 12, 1947 
Tennessee      February 21, 1947 
North Carolina      March 18, 1947 
Georgia      March 27, 1947 
Iowa       April 28, 1947 
South Dakota      July 01, 1947 
Texas       September 05, 1947 
North Dakota      June 28, 1948 
Nevada       December 04, 1952 
Alabama      August 28, 1953 
Mississippi      February 24, 1954* 
South Carolina      March 19, 1954 
Utah       May 10, 1955 
Kansas       November 04, 1958 
Wyoming      February 08, 1963 
Louisiana      July 09, 1976 
Idaho       January 31, 1985 
Oklahoma      September 02, 2001 
Indiana       February 01, 2012 
Michigan      March 08, 2013 
Wisconsin       March 09, 2015 
West Virginia      February 12, 2016 
*Mississippi passed a statute in 1954, then a constitutional amendment in 1960. 
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TABLE 3: Impact of RTW Legislation on Per Capita Disposable Income 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PCDI PCDI PCDI PCDI PCDI PCDI 
        
Post Right to 
Work 
-3,112*** 3,790*** 1,442** -358.2 3,768** -24.23 
 (1,100) (1,096) (578.9) (547.3) (743.0) (390.9) 
Population 
Density 
 -1.069*** 1.078*** 5.163*** -312.6 -253.6 




 -290.6*** 305.0*** 632.7*** -868.6 388.4* 




 148,454*** 55,189*** 5,639 87,834** -15,076 
  (9,116) (13,272) (9,541) (14,277) (8,570) 
% Union 
Member 
 220.9* 278.7*** 83.51 292.1 350.8* 
  (112.2) (59.96) (85.87) (263.9) (105.5) 
Time   1,223*** 1,315***  1,409** 
   (65.03) (74.86)  (146.2) 
Time 
Squared 
  -8.154** 1.576  1.326 
   (3.926) (3.922)  (6.711) 
Gross State 
Product 
 -2.44e-05 0.00177*** 0.000894 0.131 0.0131 
  (0.000923) (0.000648) (0.00155) (0.0848) (0.0176) 
Constant 32,485*** 18,143*** -13,077*** -24,323*** 59,886 12,093 
 (919.6) (4,366) (4,205) (4,939) (49,857) (13,158) 
Observations 867 867 867 867 51 51 
R-squared 0.045 0.637 0.892 0.959 0.874 0.988 
Number of 
State_enc 
   51 3 3 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  




TABLE 4: Impact of RTW Legislation on Income Inequality 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini 
        
Post Right 
to Work 
0.0131* 0.0222** 0.0191* 0.00588 -0.000460 0.0134** 
 (0.00707) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.00832) (0.00849) (0.00553) 
Population 
Density 
 1.43e-06 6.09e-06*** 1.36e-05 0.00157 -0.00342* 
  (1.55e-06) (2.13e-06) (1.30e-05) (0.00207) (0.00194) 
%Unemployed  0.00364*** 0.000169 -0.00126** -0.00797*** 0.00379 




 0.145* -0.0271 -0.158** -0.306 -0.118 
  (0.0773) (0.100) (0.0639) (0.258) (0.145) 
% In Union  -0.000120 0.000277 -0.00139** -0.00322 -0.00280* 
  (0.000833) (0.000858) (0.000702) (0.00227) (0.00140) 
Year = 1998      0.0105 
      (0.00637) 
Year = 1999      0.0165** 
      (0.00683) 
Year = 2000      0.0151** 
      (0.00720) 
Year = 2001      0.00387 
      (0.00764) 
Year = 2002      0.000607 
      (0.0112) 
Year = 2003      0.0113 
      (0.0140) 
Year = 2004      0.0284** 
      (0.0137) 
Year = 2005      0.0482*** 
      (0.0138) 
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Year = 2006      0.0625*** 
      (0.0128) 
Year = 2007      0.0712*** 
      (0.0124) 
Year = 2008      0.0705*** 
      (0.0127) 
Year = 2009      0.0407* 
      (0.0203) 
Year = 2010      0.0242 
      (0.0221) 
Year = 2011      0.0438** 
      (0.0180) 
Year = 2012      0.0541*** 
      (0.0176) 
Year = 2013      0.0415** 
      (0.0184) 
Gross State 
Product 
 3.51e-08*** 3.80e-08*** 9.62e-09 -8.40e-07*** -3.57e-08 
  (8.57e-09) (8.62e-09) (1.84e-08) (2.80e-07) (2.76e-07) 
Time   0.00462*** 0.00493*** 0.0153***  
   (0.00151) (0.000687) (0.00290)  
Time 
Squared 
  -0.000103 -8.13e-05** -0.000471***  
   (7.19e-05) (3.38e-05) (0.000119)  
Constant 0.587*** 0.528*** 0.543*** 0.601*** 0.697*** 0.942*** 
 (0.00491) (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0146) (0.181) (0.136) 
       
Observations 867 867 867 867 51 51 
R-squared 0.033 0.264 0.336 0.361 0.726 0.950 
Number of 
State_enc 
   51 3 3 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  





TABLE 5: Impact of RTW Legislation on Union Membership Rates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
% Union Member % Union Member % Union 
Member 
     
Post Right to Work -1.160 -0.932** -0.892 
 (0.734) (0.189) (0.992) 
Population 
Density 
-0.00381*** -0.186 -0.275 
 (0.000552) (0.161) (0.376) 
% Employed of 
Population 
0.0512 0.152 0.0411 
 (0.0438) (0.0538) (0.558) 
Educational 
Attain. (College) 
6.023 -26.40 -28.00*** 
 (5.688) (11.47) (1.426) 
Year = 1998   0.0938 
   (1.194) 
Year = 1999   -0.237 
   (1.539) 
Year = 2000   -1.195 
   (1.288) 
Year = 2001   -0.0613 
   (0.489) 
Year = 2002   -0.188 
   (1.872) 
Year = 2003   -1.136 
   (2.410) 
Year = 2004   -1.654 
   (2.397) 
Year = 2005   -1.680 
   (1.328) 
Year = 2006   -1.718 
   (1.784) 
Year = 2007   -1.294 
   (2.104) 
Year = 2008   -0.908 
   (1.551) 
Year = 2009   -0.825 
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   (2.644) 
Year = 2010   -1.787 
   (3.440) 
Year = 2011   -0.959 
   (3.598) 
Year = 2012   -1.167 
   (4.631) 
Year = 2013   -1.065 
   (4.548) 
Gross State 
Product 
3.09e-06** 2.04e-05 3.77e-05 
 (1.35e-06) (1.15e-05) (4.75e-05) 
Time -0.286*** -0.249  
 (0.0518) (0.170)  
Time Squared 0.00676*** 0.0118  
 (0.00204) (0.0153)  
Constant 10.02*** 22.98 34.48 
 (2.855) (9.780) (58.52) 
    
Observations 867 51 51 
R-squared 0.418 0.773 0.817 
Number of 
State_enc 
51 3 3 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  





TABLE 6: Impact of RTW Legislation on Union Coverage Rates 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES % Covered by Union % Covered by Union 
    
Post Right to Work -1.143** -0.979 
 (0.258) (0.922) 
Population Density -0.237 -0.00504*** 
 (0.224) (0.000637) 
% Employed of Population 0.147** 0.0582 
 (0.0216) (0.0495) 
Educational Attain. (College) -37.43 10.94* 
 (13.22) (5.701) 
Gross State Product 2.35e-05 2.74e-06** 
 (1.99e-05) (1.17e-06) 
Time -0.249 -0.345*** 
 (0.233) (0.0512) 
Time Squared 0.0151 0.00838*** 
 (0.0187) (0.00236) 
Constant 30.24 10.84*** 
 (16.52) (3.234) 
   
Observations 51 867 
R-squared 0.734 0.422 
Number of State_enc 3 51 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
